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Religious Influences on Work–Family Trade-Offs
Samantha K. Ammons
Penny Edgell

Abstract: Despite a large body of research on the influences of religion on family life and gender
ideology, few studies examined how religion affects work—family strategies. One set of strategies
involves making employment or family trade-offs—strategies of devoting time or attention to either
work or family in a situation in which one cannot devote the preferred amount of time and attention to
both, strategies that may be experienced as making sacrifices, hard choices, or accommodations. Using
1996 General Social Survey data, the authors analyze how religion affects employment and family tradeoffs. They develop hypotheses about the institutional effects of religious involvement and effects of
involvement in a conservative religious subculture. They find that religious involvement and religious
subculture shape trade-offs in gender-specific ways, and that religion affects more of men's trade-offs.
They conclude by calling for further research on the social sources of cultural frameworks that shape
men's and women's work—family strategies.
Keywords: religion, work—family

Work–family strategies are practical routines of action that coordinate paid employment and family life
(Moen & Wethington, 1992). Work–family strategies involve the exercise of agency within structural
constraints and are best understood as choices made within a limited range of options and under
conditions that systematically privatize the costs of work–family management (Becker & Moen, 1999).
For many people today, individual or couple-level work–family strategies are the only practical means of
achieving this coordination because “family-friendly” policies are not always utilized, even when
available (Blair-Loy & Wharton, 2002; Eaton, 2003). Relatively little attention has been paid to how
religion shapes work–family strategies. This is surprising, given that religion is an important source of
the moral frameworks that shape understandings of appropriate gender roles and ideal family
arrangements (Christiano, 2000; Edgell, 2005; Sherkat & Ellison, 1999). We investigate religious effects
on men’s and women’s work–family strategies, with a particular focus on what Meninno and Brayfield
(2002) called employment and family trade-offs.
In recent decades managers and professionals have been spending increasingly long hours at work
(Bluestone & Rose, 1997, 1998; Clarkberg & Moen, 2001; Figart & Golden, 1998; Hochschild, 1997;
Jacobs & Gerson, 1998; Schor, 1991), whereas other workers have experienced chronic economic
insecurity and underemployment (Schor, 1991).
Whether due to time constraints or the demands of a job that may not be family friendly but is too
precious to lose, the work–family strategies of many men and women today involve trade-offs—
strategies of devoting time or attention to either work or family in a situation in which one cannot
devote the preferred amount of time and attention to both. Mennino and Brayfield (2002) identified
two elements of trade-offs of particular interest for work–family scholars: They defined employment
trade-offs as sacrifices people make in their job or career because of their family responsibilities, and

family tradeoffs as compromises people make in their family lives because of the responsibilities of paid
work. The use of terms such as compromise or sacrifice to denote trade-offs highlights the structural
constraints that shape these choices (cf. Becker & Moen, 1999; Moen & Wethington, 1992).
The current study examines the behavioral trade-offs that people make in managing their work and
family commitments.1We used data from the 1996 General Social Survey (Davis, Smith, & Marsden,
2005), which contains several measures of employment and family trade-offs, all of which focus on
choices or decisions about allocating time to work and family life—decisions to refuse overtime or a
promotion, to cut back or add hours at work, to miss a family event, or to reduce time spent on house
tasks or caregiving. Previous research has highlighted how gender, family demands, employment
demands, and human capital shape men’s and women’s work–family strategies more generally and, in
particular, family and employment trade-offs (Bielby & Bielby, 1989; Hinze, 2000; Kmec, 1999; Mennino
& Brayfield, 2002). In our analysis we controlled for the effects of factors that were identified in previous
research and we explored whether religious beliefs and commitments have an effect on family and
employment trade-offs net of these other factors.
Blair-Loy (2003) and Gerson (2002) argued that work–family strategies are embedded in larger cultural
frameworks that apportion the moral obligations of paid work and family caretaking among members. In
the United States, religious traditions are important sources of family ideals and gender norms
(Christiano, 2000; Edgell, 2005; Sherkat & Ellison, 1999). In particular, the conservative Protestant
religious subculture is characterized by discourses that make specific claims about the gendered nature
of women’s and men’s obligations to work and to family, identifying the ideal arrangement as the
woman as caretaker and the man as breadwinner (Gallagher & Smith, 1999; Wilcox, 2004). We explored
whether and how religion influences work–family strategies. We identified institutional features
common among mainstream religious groups in the United States that may have an effect on work–
family strategies for those who are religiously involved.2 We also identified features associated with
conservative Protestant religious subculture that may influence work–family strategies in distinctive
ways for those involved in that subculture. We generated hypotheses about the effects of institutional
and subcultural aspects of religion on employment and family trade-offs in analyses that control for
other factors previously shown to shape these trade-offs. To investigate whether religion shapes
gender-specific work–family trade-off patterns, we generated analyses for male and female subsamples.

Structural Constraints on Trade-Offs
Previous research has focused largely on the structural constraints that shape how men and women
make employment and family trade-offs by analyzing the factors that make some jobs—and some
families—more demanding than others. Professional and managerial jobs are more demanding in that
they require longer hours of work (plus “face time”) and have strict career ladders that mean that
scaling back on hours or refusing a promotion entails a significant sacrifice in career trajectory (Blair-Loy,
2003; Fried, 1998; Hochschild, 1997). Family demands also vary with the presence of younger and older
children and other obligations such as an elderly or ill relative (Eriksen & Gerstel, 2002; Higgins,
Duxbury, & Lee, 1994; Hochschild, 1989). All things being equal, those with more demanding jobs are
expected to make more family trade-offs, and those with more family demands are expected to make
more employment trade-offs (Franklin, Ames, & King, 1994; Kmec, 1999; Mennino & Brayfield, 2002;
Moen & Dempster-McClain, 1987). Of course, all things are seldom equal. Human capital, or higher

levels of education, training, and work experience, can increase one’s power to resist employment
demands (Barnett & Lundgren, 1998; Buck, Lee, MacDermid, & Smith, 2000).
All of these factors—job demands, family demands, and human capital— are factors that may affect
men and women; however, none of them operates in a gender-neutral way. Gender is an aspect of the
self—gendered identities, gendered beliefs, and attitudes—and something that pervades and structures
social institutions (Hall, 1993; Martin, 2003; Mennino & Brayfield, 2002). Gender, then, is developed
through routines of interaction, and through the way that resources (such as jobs and human capital)
are distributed. Gender as a social institution is a kind of constraint on agency, a structural influence on
the choices people face in developing work–family strategies. It is unclear whether men and women
experience work–family conflict at about the same rates or if there are gender differences (Bolger,
DeLongis, Kessler, & Wethington, 1989; Duxbury, Higgins, & Lee, 1994; Frone, Russell, & Cooper, 1992;
Grzywacz, Almeida, & McDonald, 2002; Gutek, Searle, & Klepa, 1991). However, overall, the work–
family strategies they use differ. Women are more likely to make employment trade-offs, take
responsibility for family demands, and adjust their employment careers around their family’s needs
(Hochschild, 1989; Mennino & Brayfield, 2002; Moen & Sweet, 2003), choices that reproduce a structure
of gender inequality as women accrue lower lifetime earnings and occupational attainment than do
men. And for women who do choose to invest in more human capital and pursue more workcentered
lives, research suggests that this leads to more family trade-offs than the same choices lead to for men
(Fried, 1998; Hochschild, 1997).
In one sense it is entirely appropriate to treat gender as a structural constraint on employment and
family trade-offs. The structure of gender inequality, for example, is what makes women “pay more” for
making the same choices that men make; women who put career first really do bear more familyrelated costs than do men with similar human capital (Blair-Loy, 2003; Fried, 1998; Hochschild, 1997),
and the cultural ideal of the male breadwinner really does shape career ladders in a way that makes a
certain understanding of work-oriented masculinity a structural reality and a cultural norm. However, it
also makes sense to understand gender as a cultural factor that shapes how people exercise agency, or
how people choose to prioritize given the range of options that structural conditions make available to
them. Gendered norms of behavior—ideas about who ought to care for the family or who ought to
spend longer hours on the job—are developed through gendered cultural frameworks that influence
behavior. These cultural aspects of gender are often measured through gender ideology scales, and for
men and women, gender ideology has a direct influence on employment and family trade-offs (Mennino
& Brayfield, 2002). We argue that religion is another cultural factor that we need to take into account as
we analyze how people exercise their agency—how they make choices—given the structural constraints
they face.

Religious Influences on Employment and Family Trade-Offs
Religion provides cultural frameworks that specify who ought to care for the family or who ought to
work long hours to support the family. Religion and family are intertwined and interdependent
institutions (Christiano, 2000; Edgell, 2003, 2005; Houseknecht & Pankhurst, 2000; Sherkat & Ellison,
1999). Religious involvement is associated with attitudes about family and gender and shapes how men
and women invest their time and their identity in their roles as husband or wife, mother or father
(Lehrer, 1996; Sherkat, 2000; Sherkat & Ellison, 1999; Wilcox, 2004). There has been little work on how

religion shapes work–family strategies; however, other work on the influence of religion on marital
decision making suggests we cannot assume that religious ideals influence behavior, including work–
family trade-offs, in a direct and straightforward way (Denton, 2004).
We identified two different ways in which religious involvement may shape employment and family
trade-offs for men and women. First, we argue that involvement in any mainstream religious institution
may have an institutional effect on how men and women make employment or family trade-offs. We
use the term institutional to indicate features that characterize the institutional field of mainstream
religious groups in the United States and are common across the organizations within it (cf. Becker,
1999; Warner, 1993; Wilcox, Chaves, & Franz, 2004). One common feature of American religious
institutions is the centrality of religious familism—the ideology that the family is the precious, central
unit of social order, and that family life should be governed by religious moral imperatives (Bendroth,
2002; Christiano, 2000; Edgell, 2003, 2005; Sherkat & Ellison, 1999; Wilcox, 2004; Wilcox et al., 2004;
Wuthnow, 1998). It is this widespread and shared religious familism, manifested in religious discourse
and institutionalized routines of ministry (Wilcox et al., 2004; cf. Edgell, 2003, 2005), that leads scholars
to identify familism as an institutional feature of American religious institutions (Christiano, 2000; Edgell,
2003, 2005; Wilcox et al., 2004).
How might religious familism affect how people make employment or family trade-offs? As early as the
1950s, sociologists pointed to the role of churches as a primary means through which people lived out a
familyoriented lifestyle, in contrast with a lifestyle based on careerism or consumerism (Bell, 1958;
Bendroth, 2002; Wuthnow, 1998), and a recent study finds that across religious traditions
congregational leaders still encourage members to spend less time at work and more time with family,
and to reject the careerism and materialism that lead to overwork (Edgell, 2005). This leads to our first
hypotheses about institutional religious effects on employment and family trade-offs:
Hypothesis 1a: People who are more involved in mainstream religious institutions are more likely to
make employment trade-offs to spend time with family than those who are not as involved in
these institutions.
Hypothesis 1b: People who are more involved in mainstream religious institutions are less likely to
make family trade-offs because of work demands than those who are not as involved in these
institutions.
We used church attendance as our measure of religious involvement in mainstream religious institutions
because participation in a local congregation is a good indicator for exposure to these institutional
effects. In our analyses, we also explored how these institutional religious effects may vary according to
one’s family status, especially marriage and the presence of children. These two hypotheses are framed
as gender neutral because many studies suggest that religious familism operates as a cultural framework
that encourages men and women to “put family first” in their investment of time (Christiano, 2000;
Edgell, 2003, 2005; Wuthnow, 1998). However, by separating our analyses of men’s and women’s tradeoffs we can investigate whether these effects are in fact gender neutral or gender specific.
We also investigate whether involvement in a conservative Protestant religious subculture has a
particular effect on how men and women make choices regarding employment and family trade-offs. In
the United States, conservative Protestant religious subcultures continue to uphold a traditionally
gendered division of labor in the home as a moral ideal and base this on interpretations of the Bible that

not only support the idea of the man as the “spiritual head” of the family but also manifest an
understanding of men and women’s natures as essentially different (Bendroth, 2002; Gallagher & Smith,
1999; Woodberry & Smith, 1998). And this has some effects on behavior. Some religiously conservative
women restructure their labor-force participation around home demands, although the only large-scale
study to date has found that these effects disappear when controlling for a range of human capital and
labor market factors (cf. Lehrer, 1995; Sherkat, 2000). Conservative Protestant husbands tend to do less
housework than their secular or liberalreligious counterparts (Edgell, 2005; Wilcox, 2004).
On the other hand, conservative Protestant discourse about the ideal family is coupled with a kind of
pragmatic egalitarianism in marriage (Gallagher & Smith, 1999; Hochschild, 1989); Denton (2004) found
that in marital decision making about work, childrearing, and finances, conservative and liberal
Protestants are not all that different. Moreover, a considerable amount of time and attention is given in
conservative religious groups to fostering men’s involvement in the home; groups such as Promise
Keepers and church-based men’s fellowship groups encourage men to develop the skills necessary to
form loving relationships with their wives and a caring and involved style of parenting (Bartkowski, 2004;
Singleton, 2003). Wilcox (2004) argued that this has a direct influence on men’s decisions to spend more
time with their families.
Because the cultural framework of religious conservatives emphasizes gender-specific roles in the family
and essential differences in men’s and women’s natures, we develop gender-specific hypotheses about
the effects of this subculture on employment and family trade-offs. For women, this is relatively
straightforward:
Hypothesis 2: After controlling for gender ideology, conservative Protestant women will make more
employment trade-offs than nonconservative Protestant women and more than conservative
Protestant men.
Conservative Protestant women may make more employment trade-offs because of their desire to live
up to the traditionally gendered ideal of the mother as caretaker upheld by their religious subculture.
Being a conservative Protestant may affect women’s trade-off behaviors over and above the influence of
personal gender ideology.
For men, we developed competing hypotheses to test whether men are more influenced by the official
gender ideology of their religious subculture, which emphasizes their role as provider and head of the
household, or whether they are more influenced by the pragmatic egalitarianism and emphasis on
men’s involvement in the family that some have identified in the daily practices of religious
conservatism in the United States:
Hypothesis 3a: After controlling for gender ideology, conservative Protestant men will make more
family trade-offs and fewer employment trade-offs than other men, and fewer than
conservative Protestant women.
Hypothesis 3b: Conservative Protestant men will make more employment trade-offs than other men
because they understand this as fulfilling the moral imperative to be more involved in their
family life.

We tested whether the traditional gender ideology present in conservative Protestant religious
subcultures encourages men to pursue their role as the family provider and delegate more of the family
caretaking to their wives.
For men and woman, it may be that conservative religious views on gender are only partly captured by
traditional gender ideology scales, and/or that conservative Protestantism provides support for men in
transferring their gender beliefs into action. In assessing all of these hypotheses, we assess participation
in a conservative Protestant subculture by one’s identification with a conservative religious
denomination, using the standard religious affiliation item from the General Social Survey (Davis et al.,
2005). As with church attendance, we investigated whether the effects of religious subculture interact
with family status.
In summary, scholars who study work–family strategies have begun to emphasize the importance of
analyzing cultural frameworks that shape understandings of gender today, including contemporary
understandings of who is responsible for paid work and for family caretaking. We know quite a lot about
how structural constraints shape work–family strategies; however, we believe a thorough understanding
must include a consideration of structural constraints and the cultural frameworks that shape the
choices that men and women do have. Religion has a formative influence on family life in the United
States and is a primary cultural arena in which moral claims about gender and family are elaborated.
However, few studies have examined whether and how religion influences the choices that men and
women make when faced with the choices that contemporary structural arrangements make available,
including the need to balance potentially conflicting demands or allocate scarce time. No studies have
examined this question with the range of measures that we employed here, which assess multiple kinds
of employment and family trade-offs using a nationally representative data set.
This article begins the work of exploring how religious claims about moral responsibility for family
caretaking and providing influence the behavior of contemporary men and women who face choices
about investing time in work and family life. At the same time, our analyses are also sensitive to how
structural constraints influence the strategies that men and women adopt. By identifying gender-specific
and gender-neutral moral claims made by religious groups, we go beyond the sole focus on conservative
religious subculture that has characterized much of the recent work on religion and gender to facilitate a
broader understanding of the links between religion and work–family trade-offs.

Method and Data
We used data from the Gender Module of the 1996 General Social Survey (GSS; Davis et al., 2005). There
were 2,904 respondents in the 1996 GSS; however, only 1,460 respondents were surveyed in the
Gender Module. Following Kmec (1999) and Mennino and Brayfield (2002), we chose to further limit the
current sample to respondents who were working full-time, part-time, or those with a job but who were
currently not at work because of temporary illness, vacation, or strike. This reduced the sample size to
994. We then limited the sample to respondents who had valid data on all independent and dependent
variables. The exceptions are supervisor status, income, gender ideology, and church attendance (see
our discussion of each exception in the Independent Variables section). This eliminated 127
respondents. Our resulting sample was 867, 430 men (49.6%) and 437 women (50.4%).

Previous research has suggested that conservative Protestant women with young children may be more
likely to drop out of the labor force entirely until their children enter school (Lehrer, 1995; Sherkat,
2000). We checked to see if conservative Protestant women were disproportionately more likely to drop
out of our employed subsample and found that they are not. In the full 1996 GSS survey, 20% of
respondents are conservative Protestant women; in the GSS Gender Module, 19% of respondents are
conservative Protestant women, whereas for the employed subsample, the figure is 16%. Likewise,
conservative Protestant women with young children compose 4% of the full 1996 GSS, 4% of the Gender
Module, and 4% of our employed subsample.
Analytical Strategy
We perform logistic regression analysis on seven dependent variables that measure discrete work–
family strategies. All seven trade-offs were treated as separate variables and dichotomously coded
(yes/no) because we wanted to investigate whether religion had a distinctive effect on particular
employment or family trade-offs.3 Previous studies (Kmec, 1999; Mennino & Brayfield, 2002) have
treated respondents’ gender as an independent variable much like income or educational attainment.
We chose, instead, to separate our analyses by gender. This strategy allowed us to determine how the
effects of religious subcultures vary by gender. It also eases presentation of our findings and eliminates
the need for using three-way interaction terms, which are awkward to interpret because it is hard to
convey in a clear and concise way which are the appropriate comparison groups.
Because we were interested in documenting religious effects on trade-offs, we treated as controls the
variables on structural constraints (job demands, family demands, human capital) and gender ideology
identified in other research as having an effect on employment and family trade-offs (Kmec, 1999;
Mennino & Brayfield, 2002). To see what effect our religion variables had over and above our controls,
we initially ran our models first with controls and then added our religion variables; the results were not
substantially different than those presented here.4 We know that gender ideology and religious
affiliation are linked so we checked for these interactions (cf. Gallagher & Smith, 1999); we also checked
for interaction effects between our religion variables and family structure, following work that suggests
that family status and the ages of children may change religious involvement and motivate religious
identification (cf. Edgell, 2005). For ease of presentation, we discuss and show main-effects models only
when no interactions were significant.
Dependent Variables
Our seven dependent variables were drawn from the 1996 GSS Gender Module. They measured
whether respondents had ever made employment or family trade-offs in their present job because of
their family or job responsibilities. Three employment trade-off questions asked respondents whether
they had (a) refused a promotion, (b) refused overtime, or (c) cut back on their hours. Respondents
were also asked if they had ever made the following family trade-offs: (d) took on additional work,
cutting into family time; (e) been unable to do the work they usually did around the house; (f) missed a
family occasion or holiday; or (g) been unable to care for a sick child or relative.
Independent Variables
Gender ideology. To measure gender ideology, or beliefs about what men’s and women’s roles ought to
be, we created a scale ranging from 0 to 16 using four popular GSS measures of gender-role beliefs (see

Table 1). This scale is widely used by scholars, and in our analysis it had an alpha of .76. A higher score
on this scale indicates a more conservative gender ideology and a lower score a more egalitarian
ideology. To maximize our data, we followed the strategy used by Mennino and Brayfield (2002) and
recoded respondents with missing data as having “no opinion.”
Job demands. Previous scholars have found that men and women who work longer hours are more likely
to make family trade-offs than other workers (Kmec, 1999; Mennino & Brayfield, 2002), and that selfemployment, supervisory status, and occupation are associated with employment tradeoffs (Mennino &
Brayfield, 2002). In their analyses, Mennino and Brayfield (2002) found that men and women employed
by large firms were less likely to refuse overtime than those who worked at smaller firms. In our models,
we included occupation, supervisory status, self-employment status, hours worked per week, and
number of employees at the respondent’s workplace (firm size) as our job demand variables. Firm size
was dummy coded into 0 (less than 100 employees) and 1 (100 or more employees). The majority of the
sample was employed at medium- or small-sized firms. Slightly more than one third worked at a firm
with more than 100 employees (36%). Respondents worked 42 hours per week on average, with a range
of 2 to 89. Self-employment was dichotomously coded from 0 to 1 with 0 indicating that men and
women were employees and 1 signaling self-employment. Only 13% were self-employed. Occupation
was coded into professional and managerial workers (1) and blue-collar, service, military, and whitecollar workers (0). Professionals or managers composed roughly one third of our sample (32%).
Because a large percentage of GSS respondents did not report their supervisory status we chose not to
exclude these individuals from our sample (Mennino & Brayfield, 2002). Instead, we treated them as a
middle “don’t know” category and included a dummy variable for missing supervisory status in our
analysis. In the sample, 25% of respondents supervised other orkers.
Family demands. We measured family characteristics through three variables: marital status, presence
of young children, and school-aged children living in the household. Marital status was dummy coded 1
(married) and 0 (divorced, widowed, separated, never married, and single). Almost one half of the
sample were married (48%), 17% had children younger than age 6 living with them, and 22% were living
with school-aged children between age 6 and 17 years.
Human capital. We used household income, proportion of income contributed by the respondent, age,
and educational attainment as our measures of human capital. Following Kmec (1999) and Mennino and
Brayfield (2002), we substituted the midpoint value for each income category and used Pareto’s curve
(Parker & Fenwick, 1983) to set the last category midpoint to US$103,868.60 for household income and
individual income at US$97,462.43. We substituted respondent’s individual income for household
income if respondents were not married and failed to report their household income. If respondents
were married and missing either household or individual income, we substituted the mean income from
similar respondents (based on sex and occupation). Eleven percent of our sample did not report
household and respondent income. We included them in our income measure and in a separate dummy
variable. We calculated the proportion of income that respondents contributed to the household by
dividing individual income by household income. Respondents with proportions over 1 (due to missing
data reassignment) were excluded from the sample. The average household income was $44,215. The
mean respondent age was 41 years with a range of 19 to 83, and most (89%) had at least a high school
diploma.

Religion. Our religion variables are religious subculture and church attendance. We dummy coded
religious preference into other (0) and conservative Protestant (1),5 which means that our results
contrast conservative Protestants and everyone else (Catholics, Jews, non-Conservative Protestants, and
those with other or no religious affiliation).6 In our sample, 31% of women and 32% of men identified as
belonging to a conservative Protestant group. Church attendance was coded from 0 (never) to 8 (several
times a week). Rather than exclude a sizable number of respondents with missing data for church
attendance, we assigned missing cases the mean church attendance from respondents of their same
sex, religious identity, and religiosity (self-reported importance of religion). This boosted our sample by
15 cases. Respondents with missing attendance data that were also missing data on their religiosity or
religious identity were excluded from the sample. The mean church attendance for our sample was 3.5
(attended church several times a year). Fourteen percent of our sample never went to church in the past
year, 14% went to church every week, and 6% reported attending church several times a week.
Race and region. We controlled for race in our analysis, dichotomously coding it into White and Other.
The vast majority of men and women were White (82%). We also controlled for region because there is
evidence to suggest that Southerners hold more traditional gender ideology beliefs than men and
women living in other regions (Powers et al., 2003; Rice & Coates, 1995). We dummy coded region into
South (1) and Midwest, East, and West (0). Thirty-six percent of the sample lived in the South.

Results
Descriptive Findings
We found that men and women differ in predictable but important ways, specifically in their hours
worked and in income (see Table 2). On average, women earned less money than men, their earnings
constituted a smaller proportion of their household’s total income, they were more likely to have
missing data for income, and they worked 5 fewer hours per week than men. Women were also more
likely to be in managerial or professional occupations and to have higher educational attainments than
men. There were slight variations in marital status and gender ideology, and women were more likely to
have school-age children than men. Overall, close to one half of our sample were currently married;
however, men were slightly more likely to be married (52% vs. 44%) than women. Men were more likely
to be White, in supervisory positions at work, more likely to have traditional gender ideology beliefs
than women, and went to church less frequently. However, there were no gender differences in men’s
and women’s likelihood of self-identifying as a conservative Protestant.
As Table 3 shows, men are more likely to miss a family event and add additional work than women.
Women have higher likelihood of being unable to care for family members. Married men and women
are more likely than unmarried respondents to refuse a promotion, refuse overtime, cutback on their
workload, add additional work, and to miss caregiving demands. Similarly, respondents with young
children are more likely to refuse overtime, be unable to meet their caregiving responsibilities, and be
unable to fulfill their home task demands. Men and women that attend church at least once a month or
more are less likely to miss a family event than those that attend church less frequently. They are also
more likely to cut back on their work.7 There were no statistically significant differences in family tradeoffs or employment trade-offs by religious subculture.8

Table 4 and Table 5 display the results of our logistic regression analysis for women’s and men’s
employment and family trade-offs. Each dependent variable has one or two models. The first model
contains our main effects, such as gender ideology, work and family demands, religious subculture, and
church attendance. For some of our outcome variables we include a second model with interaction
terms.
Our results indicate that employment and family trade-off predictors vary by gender, that religion
operates in complex ways to affect the likelihood of making these trade-offs, and that a wider range of
men’s trade-offs are influenced by religion than is true for women. Overall, women’s employment tradeoffs are most influenced by work demands and autonomy—especially the choice to be self-employed—
and not family demands or religion. Women’s family trade-offs are influenced by various factors—work
demands, family demands, and religion, but also age and their share of household income. For men, the
story is different. Men’s work–family trade-offs are influenced by family demands and religion, whereas
their family demands are influenced by work demands, family demands, and religion.
Women
Among women, we found no support for Hypothesis 1a; religious involvement does not affect women’s
employment trade-off decisions. However, we did find support for Hypothesis 1b; church attendance,
our measure of the institutional effects of religion, does reduce women’s likelihood of making two of
our four family trade-offs. We found no support for Hypothesis 2; conservative Protestant women are
not more likely than other women to make employment trade-offs for the sake of family, although in
the model for cutting back on hours at work, the conservative Protestant effect approaches statistical
significance. Moreover, conservative Protestant women are more likely to make one of our family tradeoffs, a finding we discuss below. Overall, work demands and autonomy shape women’s employment
tradeoffs, whereas an assortment of family demands, work demands, human capital, and religion affect
women’s likelihood of family trade-offs.
Women’s employment trade-offs. As shown in Table 4, we found no support for Hypothesis 1a or
Hypothesis 2 regarding religious influences on women’s employment trade-offs. Religious involvement
and conservative religious subcultures do not encourage women to make employment tradeoffs.
However, the effect of conservative Protestant identity on women’s choice to cut back on their hours
approaches significance and may warrant further investigation in future research. Family demands and
human capital variables also are not strong predictors of employment trade-offs for women; race (being
White) does predict women’s odds of refusing a promotion. Only one type of family demand is
significant, and it is only significant for one employment trade-off of three; women with young children
are almost twice as likely to refuse overtime than are women who do not have children younger than
age 6 years. Work demands best explain women’s likelihood of making employment trade-offs. Women
are more likely to refuse a promotion if they are a supervisor and are not in a professional or managerial
occupation, and women employed in smaller firms are less likely to refuse overtime than women
employed in larger firms. Self-employed women are also more likely to cut back on their work and more
likely to refuse overtime. Women’s family trade-offs. As Table 4 shows, our findings did not reveal a
straightforward story for family trade-offs among women. Family demands, work demands, human
capital, and religion all matter, but not in uniform ways across all family trade-offs. Overall, we found
support for Hypothesis 1b. When women attend church more frequently, they are less likely to make
two types of family trade-offs. Church attendance decreases women’s odds of missing a family event.

And though women with young children at home are much more likely to report being unable to do the
work they usually do around the house, church attendance ameliorates, but does not eliminate, the
impact of young children on women’s ability to complete tasks at home.9 Unexpectedly, our findings
indicate that women within conservative religious subcultures are more likely to miss caregiving tasks
than women from moderate or liberal religious subcultures. Although this is less true for those with
young children, it is still true even for them. We believe that it is possible that conservative Protestant
women can rely on their husbands for crisis care of a sick child or relative; however, it is also possible
that these women have supportive religious networks that help in such situations.
Work and family demands have an impact on women’s family trade-offs. Married women are more
likely to take on additional work and to miss caregiving tasks but less likely than unmarried women to
miss a family event. Women with young children younger than age 6 years are 5 times more likely to
have trouble completing tasks at home, although as mentioned above, church attendance ameliorates
this effect somewhat. Women with young children are also more than 5 times more likely to have
difficulty with their families’ caregiving needs. Work demands also matter for women. Women that work
longer hours per week are more likely to have missed home tasks, and to have missed family events.
Women supervisors have higher odds of missing family events than women without supervisory duties
at work, and professional and managerial women are more likely to have missed home tasks.
Human capital variables were the weakest predictors of women’s family trade-offs. Educational
attainment, age, and income variables each only significantly fit only one family trade-off variable.
Women are more likely to add work if they have less education, and younger women are less likely to
miss a family event than older-aged women. Last, women that contribute a larger share of their earnings
to the household income have higher odds of missing home tasks because of their work demands.
Women who did not report either their household or personal income are also significantly more likely
to miss a family event.
Men
As Table 5 indicates, religion has an institutional effect on men’s odds of making family trade-offs,
supporting Hypothesis 1b; church attendance is also associated for men with cutting back on hours at
work; however, as for women, this effect is only significant at the p < .10 level, providing only suggestive
support for Hypothesis 1a. Conservative religious subcultures affect men’s likelihoods for employment
trade-offs, although the effects are mixed and provide support for Hypotheses 3a and 3b. Overall, family
demands, gender ideology, and religion, rather than work demands and human capital, best predict
men’s odds of employment trade-offs. Family and work demands and religion best explain men’s family
trade-offs.
Men’s employment trade-offs. Involvement in religious institutions and in conservative religious
subcultures encourages men to alter their work involvement but not always in the hypothesized
direction. Men from conservative Protestant subcultures are less likely to refuse a promotion. However,
men who attend church more frequently or belong to a conservative Protestant subculture are more
likely to cut back on hours spent at work; these findings are only marginally significant and should be
considered suggestive for future research.
Traditional gender ideology intertwines with religious subculture involvement and church attendance in
disparate ways that affect men’s odds of employment trade-offs. Men with traditional gender ideology

from conservative Protestant subcultures are more likely to refuse a promotion, whereas men with
traditional gender ideology that attend church more often have lower odds of cutting back their work
involvement. Gender ideology, church attendance, and religious subculture combine to affect men’s
trade-off behaviors in unique ways. Perhaps most interesting is the insight that for conservative
Protestant men, it is those with the most traditional gender ideology who are the most likely to refuse a
promotion (make an employment tradeoff), suggesting that the men who are the most influenced by
this subculture’s moral rhetoric on gender roles are the most likely, in practice, to put career second and
family first. This supports Gallagher and Smith’s (1999) argument that the traditional gender ideology
espoused by conservative Protestants can, in practice, lead to more egalitarian outcomes.
Men with young children are twice as likely to refuse a promotion, twice as likely to refuse overtime,
and more likely to cut back on their work than men without young children. Fathers of school-age
children are also more likely to cut back on their work. Marital status only significantly predicted one
type of employment trade-off. Married men are 2 times more likely to refuse overtime than unmarried
men. No work demand or human capital variables were statistically significant; however, marginally
significant results indicate that men are more likely to cut back on work when they supervise others and
more likely to refuse a promotion when their household income is high. When men work more hours
per week they are also less likely to refuse overtime.
Men’s family trade-offs. Family demands and work demands have the most influence on men’s family
trade-offs; however, religious involvement makes married men less likely to miss a family event. Gender
ideology, human capital, and religious subculture variables are not significant predictors of men’s family
trade-offs.
Men were most likely to make family trade-offs if they had heavy family or work demands. Men with
young children are more likely to be unable to care for sick family members than men without children
younger than age 6 years. If men have supervisory duties at work they have higher odds of missing a
family event, are more likely to be unable to care for family members, and have trouble finding time for
their home tasks (marginally significant). Professionals or managerial men are also more likely to be
unable to take care of their home task responsibilities but are less likely to take on additional work. Men
who are self-employed are 2 times more likely to be unable to care for family members than men who
were employees, and those that work more hours per week are significantly more likely to miss family
events.
Family demands, such as marriage, having children younger than age 6 years, or having school-age
children also affected men’s family trade-offs. Men have higher odds of adding work when they are
married or have school-age children, and married men are twice as likely as unmarried men to miss a
family event. However, church attendance interacts with marriage to affect the odds of missing a family
event. Married men who attend church frequently are less likely to miss a family occasion than married
men who do not attend church as often. Last, men that lived in the South had lower odds of working
additional hours than men residing in other regions. Comparisons—Women and Men Relative to men,
women’s trade-offs are more influenced by the presence of young children and by their share of
income. Religious involvement does make women more family oriented; however, participation in a
conservative Protestant subculture has no effect on six of women’s strategies; and, for the one strategy
for which it is significant, it works in the opposite way than was expected. The most striking difference is
that women’s employment tradeoffs are influenced almost entirely by job demands and autonomy

whereas men’s are almost unaffected by these factors and are driven by religion and family demands. In
comparison with women, job constraints play a different role for men, making them more likely to make
family trade-offs in favor of work, whereas for women, job constraints affect their employment
tradeoffs the most. Religious involvement does make men more family oriented overall. For those
conservative Protestant men who most affirm a traditional gender ideology, participation in that
subculture influences is associated with one employment trade-off in favor of their families (refusing a
promotion), whereas other conservative Protestant men are less likely to make this trade-off. And
church attendance makes married men less likely to miss an important family event.
Comparisons between women and men demonstrate pervasive gender differences in the relative
influences of job demands and human capital, family demands, and religion on employment and family
trade-offs. They also suggest the utility of using measures that can capture discrete trade-offs because
different combinations of factors affect men and women differently for different kinds of choices.
Summary
Kmec (1999) and Mennino and Brayfield (2002) conducted analyses of work–family trade-offs using the
1996 GSS. Whereas Kmec examined only three of the four family trade-offs that we included and did not
study employment trade-offs, Mennino and Brayfield studied the same seven work–family strategies
that we utilized. In many ways, our results replicate Mennino and Brayfield’s findings for the effects of
job demands, employment demands, and human capital on employment and family trade-offs and
Kmec’s results for family trade-offs. Similar to Kmec, we found that hours worked per week and having
young children significantly affect the likelihood of missing a family event, being unable to provide care
to one’s family, and to do regular house tasks. Like Mennino and Brayfield, we found that there was not
much difference in employment and family trade-offs between those with conservative and liberal
gender ideology and that family demands are significant predictors of family trade-offs. However,
because we separated our entire analysis by sex, we found that though men and women look similar in
regard to family trade-offs, their predictors of employment trade-offs vary dramatically. Work demands
are most significant for women, whereas family demands, gender ideology, and religion affect men’s
odds for employment trade-offs.

Discussion and Conclusion
Sociologists of religion often lament that their work on religion and family is not widely taken into
account by others who study the family (Ammerman & Roof, 1995; Becker & Hofmeister, 2000; Sherkat
& Ellison, 1999). Reviews of the literature on family life (Cherlin, 1996) and work–family management
(Spain & Bianchi, 1996) mention religion only in passing or not at all (Perry-Jenkins, Repetti, & Crouter,
2000).10 However, family scholars are beginning to call for just such an integration of work across
subfields (Daly, 2003; Gerson, 2002), and research that features such integration is appearing in highprofile journals (Denton, 2004; Myers, 1996; Stolzenberg, Blair-Loy, & Waite, 1995). We also believe it is
important to integrate the scholarship on religion and family life with scholarship on work–family
strategies. With Gerson (2002), we agree that we must understand more fully how cultural frameworks
shape understandings of who is morally responsible for caretaking and financial providing if we are to
understand not only the structural constraints that shape available choices but also how the choices we
make to reproduce or challenge traditional understandings of gender, work, and family life.

We set out to investigate whether and how religion may influence men’s and women’s employment and
family trade-offs. Although scholars of religion have documented many ways in which religious belief
and religious involvement influence family life and understandings of gender roles, little research has
explored how religion shapes the choices men and women make about how to invest their time when
work and family demands create conflicts or necessitate hard choices, and none of this research draws
on recent, nationally representative data and looks at a wide range of employment and family tradeoffs.
Although making trade-offs is only one type of work–family strategy, it is an important one in an era of
increasing time spent at paid work and workplaces that still tend to take a historically “male” model of
work—and career— as the norm.
Our findings support the conclusion that religion does affect some employment and family trade-offs
and that religious influences act differently on women and men and depend in part on family status. The
inclusion of religion in analyses of work–family trade-offs, we believe, can help scholars better
understand men’s and women’s work and family experiences. For example, the fact that religious
influences depend on family status for men and women suggests that religious cultural frameworks
affect how men and women interpret the relevance of family demands for their own work–family
strategies.
We hypothesized that church attendance would have a gender-neutral effect on men and women,
encouraging both to make employment trade-offs and not to make family trade-offs. We found that
church attendance makes men and women favor “family-centered” trade-offs. However, our data also
reveal that going to church affects men’s and women’s trade-offs differently, affecting different kinds of
decisions and interacting in different ways with family structure. Previous scholarship has paid a great
deal of attention to the conservative Protestant subculture, with its explicit, and very public, rhetoric
about gender roles and family norms. Our analyses suggest the importance of analyzing the institutional
features common across religious traditions in the United States. The familism others have identified as
a central feature of mainstream religious institutions does, in fact, shape the choices men and women
make.
We also found that conservative religious subcultures do affect some employment and family trade-offs
and men’s and women’s choices differently. However, we did not find strong support for the idea that
participation in a conservative religious subculture makes either women or men choose trade-offs in
more traditional, less egalitarian ways. With Denton (2004), we urge caution in assuming that
conservative Protestant rhetoric is translated in a straightforward way into patriarchal family practices
(cf. Wilcox, 2004).
Overall, we found that religion has an effect on employment and family trade-offs for men, though
being irrelevant to women’s employment tradeoffs. Taken together, our religion variables had a
significant effect on two of men’s trade-offs and three of women’s trade-offs; the marginally significant
findings for men and women on the influence of religion on cutting back on work hours merit further
investigation. In some ways, this pattern of findings is surprising. Spain and Bianchi (1996) argued that
work–family management is viewed not only in the academic literature but also in the culture at large as
a “woman’s issue.” For women, it is assumed that influences on employment and family trade-offs begin
early in life and stem from multiple sources, being “overdetermined” by structural conditions and
cultural frameworks. For men, however, religious institutions may be one of the only contexts that
encourage them to lead a family-centered life and to make trade-offs that invest time in family over

work (Edgell, 2005; Wilcox, 2004; Wilcox et al., 2004). One might have expected religion to shape men’s
trade-offs more than it does women’s. Our findings suggest that this is not the case but do suggest that
religion influences men and women differently.
It is important to note the limitations of the measures available in this data set, as they influence how to
interpret our findings and the more general claims we can make. It is impossible to tell who, in our
sample, was ever offered a promotion, or who was asked to work overtime. We do not have information
about job tenure or know how much autonomy (actual or perceived) workers in our sample have. We
also do not know about other family constraints, such as the need to care for aging parents, an
increasingly common family demand that is likely to occur just as men and women are in their prime
years in employment productivity and achievement. We cannot know if the self-employed chose this
option because it offered them more flexibility or if they were making do after a layoff or because they
were not able to find firm-based employment after dropping out of the labor force to have a child. Also,
this data set does not allow us to examine how men and women may “trade off” investment in career
and family over the life course, as a couple-level work–family strategy (Becker & Moen, 1999).
Our analysis suggests that it is worth taking religious involvement and identity into account in future
studies that explore these questions. Another area to be investigated is the effect of religion on
subjective trade-offs, which were beyond the scope of the current analysis. Our models of behavioral
trade-offs show the strong effects of structural constraints on men’s and women’s choices; and
behavioral trade-offs may be particularly constrained by structural factors. Religion, and cultural
frameworks in general, may have a greater effect on subjective trade-offs such as commitment to work
or family life, or feelings of satisfaction with employment, marriage, and parenting relationships.
Our analyses support those who are calling for more research into how cultural frameworks influence
men’s and women’s work–family strategies and show that religion should be analyzed more
systematically as a source of these cultural frameworks. Most mainstream religious institutions critique
the careerism and materialism often associated with a work-oriented life and make moral claims about
the need to put family first. Conservative religious subcultures make traditionally gendered moral claims
about appropriate work–family strategies for men and women. We believe it is important to continue to
examine how men and women seek out and utilize opportunities to express their cultural
understandings and moral priorities in their choices about work and family life.

Notes
1. Employment and family trade-offs can have subjective elements, such as reducing or restructuring
subjective commitment to paid work or family life, changing expectations for what one can accomplish,
or changes in the way one feels about one’s job or family (Bielby & Bielby, 1989; Pixley & Moen, 2003;
Price & Mueller, 1986). These subjective trade-offs, though important, are beyond the scope of the
current analysis.
2. Mainstream denotes the Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish organizations that compose the dominant
religious establishment in the United States (see Edgell, 1999, or Wuthnow, 1988). Mainline refers to a
specific group of liberal Protestant denominations (Wuthnow & Evans, 2002).

3. We also checked to see if the dependent variables scaled together well. The three employment tradeoffs have an alpha of .5584, the four family trade-offs have an alpha of .4764, and all seven variables
together have an alpha of .575, confirming our decision to treat these as separate choices in the current
analyses.
4. Models available by request.
5. The initial question on religious identification on the General Social Survey (GSS; Davis, Smith, &
Marsden, 2005) asks the respondents to name their religious preference as Protestant, Catholic, Jewish,
some other religion, or no religion. Those naming Protestant are then asked “What denomination is
that, if any?” that are field-coded into 26 possibilities or into a 27th, “Other, please specify” that is
available as a text file. Conservative Protestants are designated from these answers based on the coding
scheme used by T. W. Smith (1987) that, for conservative Protestants, yields a classification similar to
that recommended by Steensland et al. (2000).
6. We are particularly interested in whether conservative Protestants have a different profile of
employment and family trade-offs than do other respondents because there is a substantial literature
on the distinctiveness of this subculture, the thesis of which is that this distinctiveness depends largely
on, and is reproduced through, a neo-patriarchal family formation and a traditionally gendered division
of labor (Gallagher & Smith, 1999; C. Smith, 1998). Other scholars of work–family strategies have begun
to look for this “conservative Protestant” effect (Denton, 2004), and we want to expand on and
contribute to that investigation. Although this does not allow us to investigate the full range of religious
identities and how they relate to employment and family trade-offs, it is a good starting point and one
that is appropriate to our data.
7. In the current analyses we treat religious attendance as continuous. For descriptive purposes in this
section we report it as dichotomous.
8. Results (t tests) available by request.
9. The women who are most likely to be unable to complete tasks at home are those who attend church
rarely and have young children, followed by those who attend church rarely and do not have young
children, than by frequent church attenders who have young children. The least likely to be unable to
complete tasks at home are women who attend church frequently and do not have young children.
10. See Edgell (2005) for a discussion of why these literatures are not as well integrated as they might
be.
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